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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO
EXPATRIATE - FROM THE OBJECTIVE TO THE SUBJECTIVE
TEST OF VOLUNTARINESS: A SHIFT IN PREDOMINANCE
by Frederick W. Marsh, Jr.
Although the Supreme Court once defined expatriation as the voluntary
renunciation or abandonment of citizenship,' the law of expatriation has
developed with complexity. Difficulty has arisen primarily from the exist-
ence of two opposing views regarding the extent of Congress' power under
the Constitution to expatriate an American citizen against his will. One
view provides that Congress has the power, in performing its other duties,
to deprive a person of his citizenship even without his consent; thus expa-
triation is simply a means through which Congress may implement its other
powers.2 The other view denies Congress any general power to take away
a person's citizenship against his will.'
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the principal question
was not whether Congress possessed the power to expatriate, but instead
whether the individual had the power to expatriate himself. Congress fin-
ally answered this question in favor of the individual, declaring that expa-
triation was a natural and inherent right of every person.' Thus an indi-
vidual's right to expatriate himself became an unencumbered reality.
The concept of forcible expatriation appeared in 1907 when Congress
provided for the expatriation of a person upon his voluntary performance
of certain acts statutorily defined as grounds for loss of citizenship.! This
power of Congress was not seriously questioned by the Supreme Court until
1958 when strong dissents in Perez v. Brownell shook the constitutional
foundation of forcible expatriation. Thereafter, the Court began its metic-
ulous assault on the concept by striking down one-by-one the various ex-
patriation provisions of the statutes.7
Recently in Afroyim v. Rusk' the Court held that Congress lacks the
power to expatriate a person against his will for voting in a foreign elec-
tion. Moreover, the Court flatly stated that Congress has no general con-
stitutional power express or implied to take away a person's citizenship
'Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334 (1939).
'See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 292 (1967) (dissenting opinion of Justices Harlan, Clark,
Stewart, and White); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, Rusk v. Cort, 372 U.S. 144, 212 (1963)
(dissenting opinion of Justices Stewart and White); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 114 (1958)
(concurring opinion of Justice Brennan); id. at 121 (dissenting opinion of Justices Frankfurter,
Burton, Clark, and Harlan); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958) (court opinion of Justice
Frankfurter).
'See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 262 (1967) (court opinion of Justice Black); Schneider
v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 166 (1964) (court opinion of Justice Douglas); Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, Rusk v. Cort, 372 U.S. 144, 186 (1963) (concurring opinion of Justices Douglas and
Black); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 138 (1958) (concurring opinion of Justices Black and
Douglas); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 83-84 (1958) (dissenting opinion of Justices Douglas
and Black).
'Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, 15 Stat. 223.
'Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228.
6356 U.S. 44 (1958).
'See Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, Rusk v. Cort,
372 U.S. 144 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
s387 U.S. 253, 267 (1967).
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without his assent.! When read alone, this "no-power" statement indicates
that the concept of forcible expatriation has been completely discarded.
However, the Afroyim opinion leaves some doubt as to whether the Court
really intended to find that Congress has no power to expatriate a person
against his will and thus to restore the pre-1907 situation whereby a person
could lose his citizenship only through voluntary renunciation. Yet it ap-
pears that this decision has significantly altered the scope of expatriation.
With emphasis devoted primarily to a consideration of forcible expatria-
tion, the purpose of this Comment is to trace the expanding-contracting
development of the law of expatriation and to analyze its present status in
the United States.
I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ExPATRIATION
Pre-Statutory Development. Voluntary expatriation was unknown to the
early English common law. Under the principle of perpetual allegiance,
the English citizen through his own conduct could not break his ties with
his country even with the sovereign's consent."9 However, through the
Declaration of Independence, American colonists proclaimed their right to
dissolve their former ties with England and thereby refuted the English
doctrine of perpetual allegiance."
After the formation of the new nation, the question of the individual's
power to renounce his citizenship was soon raised."2 For many years, how-
ever, the Supreme Court avoided expressing an opinion directly upon the
issue." In the first case to touch upon the subject, the Court indicated that
the individual possessed the right to renounce his citizenship voluntarily, 4
but differences of opinion developed over the manner in which the right
was to be exercised."3 The earliest view was that a person could not expa-
triate himself without a bona fide change of domicile, which apparently
91d. at 257.
'Klubock, Expatriation-Its Origin and Meaning, 38 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 1, 2 (1962). It
was not until 1870 that Parliament first allowed the British subject to expatriate himself. R.
FLOURNOY & M. HUDSON, NATIONALITY LAws 59 (1929).
1 The first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence provides:
When in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve
the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among
the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature
and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind
requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation.
(Emphasis added).
" Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
"See Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailor's Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 120 (1830); Osborn
v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827-8 (1824); The Santissima Trinidad & The
St. Ander, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 347 (1822); M'Ilvaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
209, 212 (1808); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 120 (1804); Talbot
v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 161 (1795) (opinion of Justice Iredell); id. at 169 (opinion of
Justice Cushing); id. at 169 (opinion of Justice Rutledge).
14Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 162 (1795) (opinion of Justice Iredell)
That a man ought not to be a slave, that he should not be confined against his
will to a particular spot, because he happened to draw his first breath upon it;
that he should not be compelled to continue in a society to which he is accidentally
attached, when he can better his situation elsewhere, much less when he must starve
in one country and may live comfortably in another, are positions which I hold as
strongly as any man, and they are such as most nations in the world appear clearly
to recognize.
"
5 Id. at 162-63.
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meant acquisition of citizenship in another country." Gradually, another
view evolved whereby a person could expatriate himself only with the con-
sent of the government." Thus even after the Declaration of Independence,
remnants of the general doctrine of perpetual allegiance existed in the
United States. Doubts as to the nature of the individual's power to re-
nounce his citizenship led the Supreme Court as early as 1795 to express
the need for a statute clarifying the nature of expatriation;"6 however,
seventy-three years passed before Congress enacted the first statute dealing
specifically with the subject."9
Statutory Development. During the past century, the law of expatriation
has been shaped primarily by four major congressional acts dealing spe-
cifically with loss of citizenship. It should be noted, however, that in 1865
Congress provided that rights of citizenship were forfeited by any person
who deserted the military or naval service or who avoided military draft
by leaving the country."° Apparently the purpose of this statute was to
provide an additional penalty for the crimes of desertion and draft eva-
sion; therefore, it seems that only rights of citizenship, rather than citizen-
ship itself, were lost."' It was not until 1868 that Congress first dealt with
loss of citizenship per se.
Act of 1868. In 1868 Congress declared that expatriation was "a natural
and inherent right of all people."'" This statute removed the necessity for
governmental consent in order for one to renounce his citizenship, but it
placed the responsibility on the courts to determine the overt acts which
would constitute an intentional renunciation of citizenship by the indi-
vidual.
Act of 1907. With an aim toward defining the bounds of expatriation,
Congress in 1907 specifically set forth certain acts which would result in
the automatic expatriation of a citizen even against his will; thus the con-
cept of forcible expatriation officially appeared. The 1907 statute provided
that citizenship was forfeited by any American citizen who became nat-
uralized in, or took an oath of allegiance to, a foreign state," by any nat-
uralized citizen who resided for two years in the foreign state from which
he came or for five years in any foreign state, and by any American
'eThe Santissima Trinidad & The St. Ander, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 348 (1822); Talbot v.
Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 133, 152 (1795).
"'Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246 (1830); Inglis v. Trustees of the Sailor's Snug
Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 125 (1830).
'Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133, 154 (1795).
"°Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, preamble, 15 Stat. 223.
"Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, § 21, 13 Stat. 490-91. This provision was later modified in
that the penalty of expatriation did not apply to acts committed in peacetime. Act of Aug. 22,
1912, ch. 336, § 1, 37 Stat. 356.
21 CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 642 (1865). See also 43 CONG. REc. 112 (1908) (re-
marks of Congressman Payne); id. at 114 (remarks of Congressman Hull); 48 CONG. REC. 9542
(1912) (remarks of Senator Bristow).
a Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 249, preamble, 15 Stat. 223.
2 14 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 295 (1873).
24 Act of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, S 2, 34 Stat. 1228.




woman who married an alien."
Act of 1940. Through the Nationality Act of 1940, Congress greatly
expanded the grounds for forcibly expatriating American citizens." Sec-
tion 401 of the Act provided that any American citizen expatriated himself
upon becoming naturalized in a foreign state, taking an oath of allegiance
to a foreign state, serving in a foreign armed force, formally renouncing
his American citizenship while in a foreign state, deserting the American
military or naval service in time of war, or committing an act of treason
against the United States. 8 Section 404 provided that a naturalized citizen
expatriated himself by residing for two years in the foreign state where he
was born or was formerly a national if through such residence he again
acquired the nationality of that state, by residing continuously for three
years in a foreign state where he was born or was formerly a national, or
by residing continuously for five years in any foreign state." Two amend-
ments to section 401 added additional grounds for expatriation: formally
renouncing American citizenship while within the United States in time of
war," and remaining outside the jurisdiction of the United States in time
of war to avoid military or naval service."
Act of 1952. The Immigation and Nationality Act of 1952 was the
second comprehensive revision of the law of expatriation.2" Section 349 of
the Act' was a re-enactment, with little modification, of the expatriation
provisions applicable to any citizen as contained in section 401 of the 1940
Act and the amendments thereto.' Provisions relating to the naturalized
citizen remained substantially unchanged; 5 however, the new Act con-
tained a section applicable specifically to the dual national (principally one
who acquires at birth citizenship of the United States and of some foreign
state). It was provided that the dual national lost his American citizenship
by residing for three continuous years in the foreign country of which he
was also a citizen, after attaining the age of twenty-one, unless, before the
expiration of the three-year period, he formally renewed his oath of alle-
giance to the United States."6
These statutes illustrate the attempt by Congress to deal with expatria-
tion first in terms of the individual's power to expatriate himself inten-
tionally, and then to add to this concept ever-expanding grounds for the
forcible expatriation of the unwilling citizen.
26 Id. § 3. Marriage to an alien husband as a ground for expatriation was repealed in 1922. Act
of Sept. 22, 1922, ch. 411, §§ 3, 7, 42 Stat. 1022.
27Nationality Act, 5 401-10, 54 Stat. 1168-71 (1940).
2"Nationality Act, 5 401(a)-(h), 54 Stat. 1168-69 (1940).
"Nationality Act, §§ 404(a)-(c), 54 Stat. 1170 (1940).
20Act of July 1, 1944, ch. 368, § 1, 58 Stat. 677.
31 Act of Sept. 27, 1944, ch. 418, § 1, 58 Star. 746.
2 Immigration & Nationality Act, §§ 349-57, 66 Star. 267-72 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481-88
(1964).
"2Immigration & Nationality Act, § 349, 66 Stat. 267 (1952), as amended, Act of Sept. 3,
1954, ch. 1256, 68 Stat. 1146, and Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, 75 Stat. 656, 8
U.S.C. § 1481 (1964).
24 See notes 28, 30, 31 supra and accompanying text.
2"Immigration & Nationality Act, § 352, 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484 (1964). See
note 29 supra and accompanying text.
"6 Immigration & Nationality Act, § 350, 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1482 (1964).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE EXPATRIATION STATUTES
In dealing with the question of Congress' power to expatriate an Amer-
ican citizen against his will, the Supreme Court employed a test of volun-
tariness. However, when applied to the concept of forcible expatriation,
the test caused problems because voluntary has two possible meanings. The
term can mean either the voluntary performance of a statutorily defined
act which causes loss of citizenship regardless of the actor's intention (an
objective test) or the voluntary desire of a person to renounce or abandon
his citizenship intentionally by performing the act (a subjective test).
Pre-1958 Cases: An Assumption of Congressional Power To Expatriate-
Development of the Objective Test. In the cases prior to 1958, the Supreme
Court applied the objective test to determine if the person had voluntarily
performed the proscribed act. In Mackenzie v. Harea" the Court dealt for
the first time with the issue of the forcible expatriation of an unwilling
citizen. Mrs. Mackenzie, a native-born citizen, married a British subject
who was permanently residing in California. Later she attempted to regis-
ter to vote but was refused on the ground that she was no longer a citizen
as a result of her marriage to an alien. Although Mrs. Mackenzie apparently
never intended to give up her citizenship, the Court held that she had lost
her citizenship under the 1907 Act"s because she had voluntarily married
an alien with notice of the consequence of such conduct."
A quarter of a century later, the Court faced the same question in Per-
kins v. Elg.40 Miss Elg was born in the United States of naturalized Swedish
parents. While she was a child, her parents returned with her to Sweden,
and she remained there until reaching majority. Under Swedish law, re-
sumption of residence in Sweden repatriated the parents and carried with
it Swedish citizenship for the child. Shortly after reaching majority, Miss
Elg returned to the United States, but she was soon threatened with de-
portation as an alien illegally in this country. The Supreme Court con-
cluded that Miss Elg had not lost her American citizenship on the ground
that her removal from this country was not a voluntary act on her part,
since it had occurred during her minority."
The question of forcible expatriation was not considered again by the
Court until 1950 in Savorgnan v. United States." In this case Mrs. Sa-
vorgnan, a native-born citizen, sought Italian citizenship in order that an
Italian Consul serving in the United States might obtain royal consent to
marry her. She was granted Italian citizenship, and in the process, she
" 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
SSAct of March 2, 1907, ch. 2534, S 3, 34 Stat. 1228. The statute provided that any American
woman who married a foreigner took the nationality of her husband.
"
5Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1915). Marriage to an alien husband as a ground
for expatriation was repealed in 1922. See note 26 supra.
40307 U.S. 325 (1939).
41id. at 334, 343. Accord, Mandoli v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133, 137 (1952), where the Court
under very similar circumstances pointed out that there was no congressional policy designed to
subject a native-born citizen to the burden and hazard of electing between his dual citizenships
at majority.
42338 U.S. 491 (1950).
[Vol. 22
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signed an instrument expressly renouncing her American citizenship and
swearing allegiance to the King of Italy." The Court held that Mrs. Sa-
vorgnan had lost her citizenship under the Acts of 1907 and 1940 by her
voluntary naturalization as an Italian citizen followed by her residence
abroad," even though at no time did she intend by such action to give up
her American citizenship. The Court pointed out that statutory expatria-
tion through the voluntary performance of a specified act did not depend
upon the undisclosed intent of the person doing the act."
In the preceding cases, the ability of Congress to take away a person's
citizenship against his will was not considered specifically in terms of the
power of Congress to expatriate. The Court apparently assumed that Con-
gress had such power and proceeded to consider only the question of
whether the person voluntarily performed the act which resulted in loss of
citizenship regardless of his intention. In the two cases in which expatria-
tion was upheld, it should be noted that the expatriate apparently acquired
the citizenship of another country in performing the act which caused her
loss of American citizenship; therefore, the expatriate was not without a
country.
1958 Cases: The Questioning of Congressional Power To Expatriate-A
Lessening Predominance of the Objective Test. It was not until 1958 in
Perez v. Brownell," the first of three expatriation cases decided on the same
day, that members of the Court first questioned the constitutional power
of Congress to take away a person's citizenship against his will. In contrast
to its prior decisions upholding the expatriation of an unwilling citizen,
the Court in Perez upheld the expatriation of a person even though he had
not acquired another nationality. This resulted in a stateless person and ap-
parently caused the dissenters deep concern over the existence of such con-
gressional power.
The case involved a native American. Mr. Perez was born in Texas in
1909 but went with his parents in 1920 to Mexico, where he remained
until 1943. The Government alleged that he had expatriated himself under
the amended 1940 Act, section 401 (e) by voting in a foreign political
election 7 and section 401 (j) by remaining outside the United States in
" The instrument was written in Italian and was not translated to her, but she understood that
it related to her citizenship and to the acquisition of the royal consent for Mr. Savorgnan to marry
her.
44 Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 506 (1950).
4Id. at 499-500. In a 1955 case, the Court did not reach the question of forcible expatriation
but dealt only with the burden of proof to be applied in such cases. The Court held that the
Government, in alleging that expatriation of the citizen had occurred regardless of his intention,
had the heavy burden of proving that fact by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. Gon-
zales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955). This standard of proof was adopted from the denaturaliza-
tion cases. See Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944); Schneiderman v. United States,
320 U.S. 118 (1943). See also Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961); Chaunt v. United
States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960); Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958). Recently the same
"clear, unequivocal, and convincing" standard of proof has been extended by the Court to de-
portation cases. Woodby v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
46356 U.S. 44 (1958).
4 Nationality Act, § 401(e), 54 Stat. 1169 (1940), superseded by, Immigration & Nationality
Act, § 349(a)(5), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1964).
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time of war to avoid military service. " In a five-to-four decision, 9 the
Court held that Perez had expatriated himself under section 401 (e) by
voting in a Mexican election, but it did not reach the constitutionality of
section 401 (j)."
Speaking for the majority, Justice Frankfurter employed a rational
nexus theory as the basis for supporting the Court's conclusion that Con-
gress had the power to expatriate a citizen against his will. Under this
theory, the Court specified that a reasonable relation must exist between a
specific power in Congress (regulation of foreign affairs) and the means
employed by Congress to carry the power into execution (withdrawal of
citizenship)." Thus in upholding the constitutionality of section 401 (e)
as a reasonable exercise of Congress' power to regulate foreign affairs, the
Court said:
The importance and extreme delicacy of the matters here sought to be regu-
lated demand that Congress be permitted ample scope in selecting appropriate
modes for accomplishing its purpose. The critical connection between this
conduct (voting in a foreign election] and loss of citizenship is the fact that
it is the possession of American citizenship by a person committing the act
that makes the act potentially embarrassing to the American Government
and pregnant with the possibility of embroiling this country in disputes
with other nations. The termination of citizenship terminates the problem."s
In Perez a majority of the Court again applied the objective test of vol-
untariness, holding that since Perez voluntarily voted in a foreign election,
he automatically lost his American citizenship.s" However, the Court no
longer simply assumed that Congress had the power to expatriate one
against his will.
In a strong dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices
Black and Douglas, concluded that the Government had no constitutional
power to take away the citizenship of a native-born or naturalized Ameri-
can citizen against his will.' The Chief Justice emphasized that citizenship
could be voluntarily renounced or voluntarily abandoned through certain
" Nationality Act, § 401, 54 Stat. 1168 (1940), as amended, Act of Sept. 27, 1944, ch. 418,
§ 1, 58 Stat. 746, superseded by, Immigration & Nationality Act, S 349(a) (10), 66 Stat. 268
(1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(10) (1964).
"9Constitutional: Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, Harlan, and Brennan. Unconstitutional:
Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker.
50 356 U.S. at 62.
" The test was whether Congress had concluded not unreasonably that there was a relevant
connection between the fundamental source of power and the ultimate legislative action. Id. at 58.
sa Id. at 60.
sa,"Of course, Congress can attach loss of citizenship only as a consequence of conduct engaged
in voluntarily. . . .But it would be a mockery of this Court's decisions to suggest that a person,
in order to lose his citizenship, must intend or desire to do so." Id. at 61.
S"Id. at 77 (dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren).
Citizenship is man's basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have rights.
Remove this priceless possession and there remains a stateless person, disgraced and
degraded in the eyes of his countrymen. He has no lawful claim to protection from
any nation, and no nation may assert rights on his behalf. His very existence is at
the sufferance of the state within whose borders he happens to be. In this country
the expatriate would presumably enjoy, at most, only the limited rights and privileges
of aliens, and like the alien he might even be subject to deportation and thereby
deprived of the right to assert any rights. This government was not established with
power to decree this fate.
Id. at 64-65 (dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren) (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 22
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actions in derogation of an undivided allegiance to this country, and, in
recognizing the consequences of such action, the Government was not
taking away citizenship, but was "simply giving formal recognition to the
inevitable consequence of the citizen's voluntary surrender of his citizen-
ship." 5 However, it seems that the Chief Justice was using "voluntary" in
its subjective sense because he indicated that citizenship could be lost only
if the person intentionally renounced or abandoned it.
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, also dissented in a separate
opinion in which he emphasized two points. First, he pointed out that not
a word in the Constitution covered expatriation; thus no branch of the
Government had any power to divest a person of his citizenship against
his will." He thereby indicated an adherence to the subjective test of vol-
untariness. Second, he indicated that in his opinion expatriation required a
voluntary attachment to or citizenship in another country."
Although in Perez the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute
involved, that same day the Court for the first time in Trop v. Dulles's
declared a provision of the expatriation statutes unconstitutional. Trop
involved a citizen who was court martialed and convicted of desertion
while serving in the United States army during World War II. He was
later denied a passport to return to the United States on the ground that
he had lost his citizenship under section 401 (g) of the 1940 Act by de-
serting the armed forces in time of war, but the Court in a five-to-four
decision struck down that provision."
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for only four members of the Court,"1
found section 401 (g) unconstitutional for two reasons. First, he indicated,
as he had in his Perez dissent, that Congress has no power to take away a
person's citizenship unless he voluntarily renounced or abandoned it. In
his view, desertion in time of war did not necessarily signify allegiance to
a foreign state; thus the act in itself did not represent a voluntary renun-
ciation or abandonment of citizenship.6' Consequently, Trop could not be
expatriated because he had not renounced or abandoned his citizenship.
The Chief Justice again seemed to apply a subjective test of voluntar-
iness, but realizing that this "no-power" view of congressional expatriation
had not yet been accepted by a majority of the Court, he offered a second
basis for the Court's decision. Even assuming as sound law the rational
nexus basis for supporting the constitutional power of Congress to ex-
patriate, the Chief Justice held that section 401 (g) was still unconstitu-
tional as a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.' Thus in essence the Chief Justice
551d. at 68-69 (dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren).
56 Id. at 79, 84 (dissenting opinion of Justices Douglas and Black).
a" Id. at 79, 80 (dissenting opinion of Justices Douglas and Black).
5 3 5 6  U.S. 86 (1958).
'
9 Nationality Act, § 401 (g), 54 Stat. 1169 (1940), suterseded by, Immigration & Nationality
Act, § 349(a)(8), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8) (1964).
66 Unconstitutional: Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Douglas, Whittaker, and Brennan.
Constitutional: Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, and Harlan.
6 Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker.




never reached the application of the rational nexus theory because he held
that the expatriation of Trop under the circumstances violated a sub-
stantive right guaranteed by the Constitution.
Justice Brennan, who had voted with the majority in Perez, upholding
the constitutionality of section 401 (e) (voting in a foreign election),
concurred separately in Trop and cast the deciding vote declaring section
401 (g) unconstitutional. Applying the rational nexus theory of Perez,
Justice Brennan concluded that section 401 (g) was unconstitutional be-
cause expatriation for deserting the armed forces in time of war was not
reasonably related to Congress' power to wage war." Thus it was Justice
Brennan's switch that changed the whole complexion of the Court's view
of forcible expatriation.
Nishikawa v. Dulles, 5 the third case decided that day, involved section
401 (c), which provided for loss of citizenship for serving in a foreign
armed force." The Court did not reach the constitutionality of that pro-
vision, but instead held that the Government had failed to sustain the
burden of proving by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the
act of serving in the foreign armed force was voluntarily performed."
It appears from these cases that a majority of the Court at this time still
adhered to the view that Congress possessed the power to expatriate an un-
willing citizen. Following the objective approach of determining whether
or not the expatriating act had been voluntarily performed, the Court in
Perez concluded that such congressional power existed by finding a rational
nexus between the power of Congress to regulate foreign affairs and
forcible expatriation as a means for executing that power. However, the
view that Congress had the power to effect forcible expatriation was great-
ly undermined by the strong dissents. Furthermore, the Court in Trop
effectively emasculated the "power" view when it concluded that Con-
gress had no constitutional power to expatriate Trop against his will for
deserting the armed forces in time of war. This may explain why the
Court seemed very reluctant to face squarely the "power" issue again in
the expatriation cases which followed.
1963 and 1964 Cases: An Avoidance of the Congressional Power Question
-Additional Theories of Unconstitutionality. In the cases which were
decided in 1963 and 1964 the Court amplified the approach begun in
Trop and effectively avoided the congressional power question by declaring
other provisions of the Acts of 1940 and 1952 unconstitutional because
they violated specific constitutional guarantees. Rusk v. Cort" involved a
native-born citizen who had remained outside the United States during the
Korean conflict to avoid military service. Similarly, in Kennedy v. Men-
doza-Martinez"' a dual national had avoided military service during World
64 Id. at 114 (concurring opinion of Justice Brennan).
65356 U.S. 129 (1958).
66 Nationality Act, § 401 (c), 54 Stat. 1169 (1940), superseded by, Immigration & Nationality
Act, § 349(a)(3), 66 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3) (1964).
6 356 U.S. at 136.




War II by remaining outside the United States. In these companion cases
the Government contended that the men had expatriated themselves under
section 349(a) (10) of the 1952 Act and its predecessor, section 401 (j)
of the amended 1940 Act. Speaking through Justice Goldberg, the Court
in a five-to-four decision71 asserted that forcible expatriation as a conse-
quence of remaining outside the United States to avoid military service was
essentially penal in character and held that the provision was unconstitu-
tional because it deprived the petitioners of citizenship without procedural
due process of law." Again, Justice Brennan's concurring vote swung the
pendulum toward unconstitutionality, and he expressly declared that he
now had some doubts about the correctness of the Perez decision.2
The following year the Court in Schneider v. Rusk 4 declared another
provision of the expatriation statutes unconstitutional. Schneider, a Ger-
man national by birth, had come to the United States with her parents
while still a child. In this country she acquired derivative American citi-
zenship through her mother and thus became a dual national. Later she
returned to Germany and resided there for several years, and she was sub-
sequently denied a passport to return to the United States on the ground
that she had expatriated herself under section 352 (a) (1) of the 1952
Act7 by residing continuously in her native country for more than three
years. Speaking through Justice Douglas, the Court in a five-to-three deci-
sion" held the provision unconstitutional as a violation of substantive due
process.7 The Court concluded that living abroad was "no badge of lack
of allegiance and in no way [evidenced] a voluntary renunciation of na-
tionality and allegiance."" Since there was no comparable limitation on the
freedom of a native-born citizen to live abroad, the Court found that the
provision discriminated unreasonably against the naturalized citizen and
indeed created a second-class citizenship. The language of Justice Douglas
revealed sympathy for the view that Congress has no power to take away
one's citizenship against his will; " however, it was not necessary for the
Court to consider the "power" question because it had found that the sta-
tutory provision itself violated a substantive right guaranteed by the Con-
stitution.
7 Section 401 (j) was added to the Nationality Act of 1940 by amendment in 1944. Act of
Sept. 27, 1944, ch. 418, § 1, 58 Stat. 746, superseded by, Immigration & Nationality Act, 5
349(a)(10), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(10) (1964).
71Unconstitutional: Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Goldberg.
Constitutional: Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White. After the 1958 decisions, Justices
Stewart, White, and Goldberg had replaced respectively Justices Burton, Whittaker, and Frank-
furter.
72372 U.S. 186 (1963).
7 Id. at 187 (concurring opinion of Justice Brennan).
74377 U.S. 163 (1964).
7' Immigration & Nationality Act, § 352(a) (1), 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a) (1)
(1964).
76 Unconstitutional: Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Douglas, Stewart, and Goldberg.
Constitutional: Justices Clark, Harlan, and White.
7t 377 U.S. at 168-69.
78 id. at 169.79 Id. at 168-69.
"",There is one view that the power of Congress to take away citizenship for activities of the
citizen is non-existent absent expatriation by the voluntary renunciation of nationality and allegi-
ance. . . . That view has not yet commanded a majority of the entire Court." Id. at 166.
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Strangely enough, on the same day that Schneider was decided, an equal-
ly divided Court"1 in Marks v. Esperdys2 upheld the constitutionality of
section 349 (a) (3) of the 1952 Act s" providing for the expatriation of a
person who served in the armed forces of a foreign state without the prior
consent of the United States Secretaries of State and Defense. The court of
appeals had upheld the constitutionality of the provision on the authority
of the Perez decision." The obvious inconsistency among these cases cre-
ated additional confusion concerning the existence of congressional power
to expatriate a person against his will;" yet three years passed before the
Court again had a chance to deal with the power question.
III. AFROYIM V. RUSK: ADOPTION OF THE "NO-POWER" VIEW-
A SHIFT TO THE SUBJECTIVE TEST OF VOLUNTARINESS
In Afroyim v. Rusk" the Supreme Court squarely faced the issue of
Congress' power to expatriate one against his will, and the seemingly un-
equivocal resolution of that issue by the Court revealed a profound change
in its position. The case involved a naturalized American citizen who had
gone to Israel in 1950 and had voted in an Israeli legislative election the
following year. As a result, the State Department refused to renew his pass-
port, asserting that he had lost his citizenship under section 401 (e) of the
1940 Act 7 by voting in a foreign political election.
The broad issue before the Court was "whether Congress [could] con-
sistently with the Fourteenth Amendment enact a law stripping an Ameri-
can of his citizenship which he [had] never voluntarily renounced orgiven up."" Speaking through Justice Black, the Court in a five-to-four
decision 8 held section 401 (e) unconstitutional and specifically overruled
Perez v. Brownell." In view of the language of the fourteenth amendment,
the Court concluded that Congress had no power, express or implied, to
take away a person's citizenship "without his assent."'
81 It is probable that Justices Harlan, Clark, White, and Stewart voted in favor of the con-
stitutionality of the provision; whereas, Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black, Douglas, and
Goldberg probably voted for the unconstitutionality of the provision.
82377 U.S. 214 (1964).
8Immigration & Nationality Act, § 349(a)(3), 66 Stat. 267-68, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3)
(1964).
"
4Marks v. Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1963).
85Justice Brennan took no part in the decisions of Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964),
or Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S. 214 (1964).
'6387 U.S. 253 (1967).
"'Nationality Act, § 401 (e), 54 Star. 1169 (1940), superseded by, Immigration & Nationality
Act, § 349(a)(5), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a) (5) (1964).
88387 U.S. at 256.
8 Unconstitutional: Chief Justice Warren, Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, and Fortas. Con-
stitutional: Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, and White. After the 1964 decisions, Justice Fortas
had replaced Justice Goldberg.
90387 U.S. at 268.
" Id. at 257, 268 (emphasis added).
It is interesting to note that four years before the Perez decision, a lack of congressional power
to expatriate a person against his will had been strongly urged by a federal district court which
held unconstitutional the same voting provision involved in the Perez and Afroyim cases. Terada
v. Dulles, 121 F. Supp. 6 (D. Hawaii 1954): "Without this essential element of consent by the
citizen, the statutory attempt to expatriate the citizen unilaterally is beyond the power of Con-
gress, and therefore invalid." Id. at 12.
However, thirteen years passed before that view commanded a majority of the Supreme Court.
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
COMMENTS
[A]ny doubt as to whether prior to the passage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Congress had the power to deprive a person against his will of citizen-
ship once obtained should have been removed by the unequivocal terms of
the Amendment itself. It provides its own constitutional rule in language
calculated completely to control the status of citizenship: "All persons born
or naturalized in the United States ... are citizens of the United States ......
There is no indication in these words of a fleeting citizenship, good at the
moment it is acquired but subject to destruction by the Government at
any time. Rather the Amendment can most reasonably be read as defining
a citizenship which a citizen keeps unless he voluntarily relinquishes it. Once
acquired, this Fourteenth Amendment citizenship was not to be shifted,
canceled, or diluted at the will of the Federal Government, the States, or
any other governmental unit.9"
The Court emphasized that its holding did nothing more than give to the
citizen that to which he was already entitled: "a constitutional right to
remain a citizen in a free country unless he voluntarily relinquishes that
citizenship.""
The dissenters, who emphasized that the term voluntary has two mean-
ings, strongly objected to the Court's decision because the majority had in
essence defined voluntary only in terms of the individual's subjective intent
to give up his citizenship." They pointed out that there was nothing in the
history, purpose, or language of the fourteenth amendment to forbid Con-
gress in all circumstances from taking away a person's citizenship against
his will."
Questions Raised by the Afroyim Decision. In overruling Perez v. Brown-
el, 96 the Court's decision in Afroyim' effectively destroyed the rational
nexus theory as a means for establishing congressional power over forcible
expatriation. Yet the Court's failure to define clearly the term assent raises
several questions regarding the full impact of the decision.
The term assent has been defined to mean consent or agreement;"8 thus
carried to its logical extreme, the term, when applied to expatriation, may
mean that a person cannot be divested of his citizenship without his actual,
verbal consent. This seemed to be the meaning that Justice Black attached
to the term throughout the Court's opinion. However, the Court did not
discuss the possibility of abandonment of citizenship, even though Justice
Black in a prior decision had said that a person could abandon, as well as
renounce, his citizenship. Thus Afroyim leaves some doubt as to whether
the present concept of expatriation also includes a voluntary abandonment
92 387 U.S. at 261-62 (emphasis added). This broad rule clearly applies only to citizenship
lawfully acquired and has no application to cases involving the cancellation of citizenship illegally
or fraudulently procured. Id. at 267 n.23. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961);
Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946) ; Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
93 387 U.S. at 268.
94Id. at 269 (dissenting opinion of Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, and White).
9' Id. at 292 (dissenting opinion of Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, and White).
0356 U.S. 44 (1958).
9' 387 U.S. 253 (1967). See Immigration & Nationality Act, § 349(a) (5), 66 Stat. 268 (1952),
8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(5) (1964).
" WEBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1960).
99"Of course a citizen has the right to abandon or renounce his citizenship and Congress can
enact measures to regulate and affirm such abjuration." Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 139
(1958) (concurring opinion of Justices Black and Douglas).
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of citizenship in the absence of the person's actual, affirmative consent to
relinquish his citizenship.
This question is perhaps only one of semantics. A person's voluntary per-
formance of an act in complete derogation of an undivided allegiance to
the United States (abandonment) may be one form of overt "assent"
which Justice Black would accept as meeting the subjective test of volun-
tariness. Furthermore, perhaps the test of voluntariness employed in
Afroyim was meant to be neither purely subjective nor purely objective,
but a mixed test having a predominantly subjective element.
If expatriation does include an abandonment concept, the Afroyim
decision raises the additional question of what acts, when willingly per-
formed by the citizen, may be defined by Congress as constituting an
abandonment of citizenship. Must such an act always be in complete dero-
gation of an undivided allegiance to this country? If so, such broad phrases
as "in derogation of an undivided allegiance,"' '4 "without his assent,
1 °1
"against his will,' ' ° and "unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizen-
ship ' necessarily require further consideration by the Court.
The Afroyim opinion suggests that the Government may not take away
a person's citizenship because he has voluntarily performed a specified act
indicating an intent to relinquish citizenship unless certain procedural nice-
ties have been followed. This possibility raises the question of whether the
Afroyim test places a burden upon the citizen affirmatively to object to his
proposed expatriation and, if so, what type of objection must be made in
order to preserve his citizenship. If the broad language of the opinion is
interpreted literally, this burden, if it exists at all, is slight.
Such an interpretation raises the further question of whether the person's
silence upon the matter of his proposed expatriation may be construed by
the Government as constituting an assent thereto. In this connection one
may ask what type of notice must the Government give to the proposed
expatriate? How long may a person wait and still be able to object effec-
tively to his proposed expatriation? Again, if the Afroyirn language "with-
out his assent" is construed literally, perhaps the person may never be pre-
cluded from objecting to his proposed loss of citizenship.
It is certain from Afroyim that a majority of the Court has now con-
cluded that Congress has no power to take away a person's citizenship
against his will, and in reaching that conclusion, the Court has adopted
some form of the subjective test of voluntariness. Yet these questions indi-
cate that a more precise explanation of what is meant by the term assent
must be forthcoming if the Afroyirn test is to serve as a guide for delineat-
ing the power of Congress in the area of expatriation.
IV. THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE EXPATRIATION STATUTES
Prior to Afroyim only three of the thirteen statutory provisions"' pro-
' Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 68 (1958) (dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren).
101Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
102 Id. at 262.
'"Id. at 268.
14Immigration & Nationality Act, §§ 349(a)(1)-(10), 66 Stat. 267-68 (1952), 8 U.S.C. 55
1481 (a) (1)-(10) (1964); § 350, 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1482 (1964); §5 352(a)(1),
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viding for expatriation upon the performance of a specified act had been
specifically declared unconstitutional: deserting the armed forces in time
of war,' 5 remaining outside the United States to avoid military service,"
and residence of a naturalized citizen for three continuous years in a state
in which he was born or was formerly a national.' 7 However, the practical
effect of the Court's decisions rendered prior to Afroyim probably made
other statutory provisions likewise defective. For example, since the resi-
dence of a naturalized citizen for three years in the state of his birth or
former nationality as a ground for expatriation was held unconstitutional
because it unreasonably discriminated against the naturalized citizen in
violation of due process,' °° it appears that the similar section providing for
the expatriation of a naturalized citizen upon his residing for five continu-
ous years in any foreign state "' was equally defective. In addition, the pro-
vision calling for the expatriation of a dual national because of his residence
in the foreign state of his birth for three continuous years after attaining
majority"0 was likewise constitutionally questionable. Such was the prob-
able status of the expatriation statutes prior to Afroyim.
In view of Justice Black's broad assertion in the Afroyim opinion that
Congress has no power to divest a person of his American citizenship
"without his assent,"'' . the potential effect of that decision may be much
more profound than the mere holding that voting in a foreign political
election as a ground for expatriation is unconstitutional. Thus, following
the apparent Afroyirn rationale, the remaining statutory provisions may
be briefly considered.
Naturalization in a Foreign State."' The voluntary naturalization of a
person in a foreign state upon his own free initiative represents a positive
attachment to another country and may constitute strong evidence that
he has renounced his American citizenship. Under Chief Justice Warren's
view, this would perhaps amount to an intentional abandonment of citi-
zenship because the act is in derogation of an undivided allegiance to the
United States. Yet the question still remains: May a person acquire another
nationality and at the same time have no subjective intention of giving up
his American citizenship? If under a strict application of the Afroyim test
expatriation does not include an abandonment concept, then perhaps this
provision is also beyond the power of Congress to enforce against the will
of the citizen.
(2), 66 Star. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1484(a) (1), (2) (1964).
"5 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). See Immigration & Nationality Act, § 349(a) (8), 66
Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1964).
0' Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, Rusk v. Cort, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). See Immigration & Na-
tionality Act, § 349(a)(10), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. S 1481 (a) (10) (1964).
'" Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). See Immigration & Nationality Act, § 3 52(a) (1),
66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) (1964).
108 Id.
' Immigration & Nationality Act, § 3 52(a) (2), 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a) (2)
(1964).
"..Immigration & Nationality Act, 5 350, 66 Stat. 269 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1482 (1964).
".. 387 U.S. at 257.




Oath of Allegiance to a Foreign State. ' Taking an oath of allegiance to
a foreign state does not necessarily involve the simultaneous acquisition of
another nationality. The oath itself may evidence a dilution of allegiance
to the United States. However, in the absence of the person's actual in-
tention to give up his citizenship, the oath may be characterized perhaps
as nothing more than abandonment, subject to the same potential con-
stitutional objections as naturalization in a foreign state.
Service in a Foreign Armed Force."' Service in a foreign armed force
was at issue in Marks v. Esperdy,"' but Justice Brennan's abstention re-
sulted in an equally divided Court's affirmance of the constitutionality of
the provision. However, in view of Justice Brennan's apparent change of
position in Afroyim, it is likely that this provision lies beyond the consti-
tutional power of Congress, even though the act may evidence a dilution
of allegiance to this country.
Employment by a Foreign Government.'' Employment by a foreign
government may also represent a dilution of allegiance to the United
States; however, this is not necessarily true. Consequently, such employ-
ment may be characterized, if at all, as nothing more than abandonment
of citizenship. In the absence of the person's assent to his loss of citizenship,
this provision is subject to the same potential constitutional objections as
the naturalization and oath of allegiance provisions.
Formal Renunciation in a Foreign State;.. Formal Renunciation Within
the United States."' The formal renunciation of American citizenship by
a person capable of understanding the meaning of his act is the best pos-
sible example of an overt manifestation by that person of his subjective
intention to cast off his American citizenship. Thus the constitutionality
of these provisions is basically secure because they are consistent with all
viewpoints and meet even the most stringent requirements of Afroyim. It
seems well settled that a person can intentionally renounce his citizenship
even if it results in statelessness.
Committing Treason and Other Related Acts."' Although acts of treason
against the United States represent an extreme dilution of allegiance to
this country, it is difficult to say that such acts in all cases represent an
overt manifestation of a subjective intention to give up American citizen-
ship. It seems certain from Trop v. Dulles"' that expatriation cannot be
imposed as an additional punishment for a crime, and in the absence of the
person's assent to loss of citizenship, it seems that under Afroyim the con-
"' Immigration & Nationality Act, § 349(a) (2), 66 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (2)
(1964).
"
4 Immigration & Nationality Act, § 349(a) (3), 66 Stat. 267 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (3)
(1964).
"' 377 U.S. 214 (1964).
1 6 Immigration & Nationality Act, S 349(a) (4), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. S 1481 (a) (4)
(1964).
17 Immigration & Nationality Act, S 349(a) (6), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (6)
(1964).
118 Immigration & Nationality Act, S 349(a) (7), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (7)
(1964).
"0 Immigration & Nationality Act, S 349(a) (9), 66 Stat. 268 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (9)
(1964).
120356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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stitutionality of even this provision is questionable. But one accused of
treason must remember that if he asserts his American citizenship and sub-
jects himself to the jurisdiction of this country, he may suffer the ultimate
penalty of death upon conviction.
V. CONCLUSION
In view of the Supreme Court's decision in Afroyim v. Rusk,"' it appears
that expatriation now includes only the individual's right to renounce his
American citizenship. By reversing its position on the subject of expatria-
tion, 122 the Court seemingly has created an indefeasible American citizen-
ship which once lawfully acquired by the individual through birth or nat-
uralization remains constitutionally secure in the absence of his express,
intentional, and voluntary renunciation thereof.
Perhaps Congress still has the power, as in the case of the convicted
criminal, to take away rights of citizenship, rather than citizenship itself,
upon the individual's performance of certain proscribed acts; 2 however,
when Trop v. Dulles" is considered in conjunction with Afroyimn, even
this power becomes questionable. Moreover, to say broadly as the Court did
in Afroyim that Congress has no express or implied power to expatriate a
citizen without his assent denies Congress an effective means of relieving
this country of the responsibility of protecting those persons who com-
pletely shirk their responsibilities as citizens while at the same time seek
to reap the full benefits of American citizenship. Such a broad assertion
seems contrary to the concept of sovereignty itself.
It takes no stretch of the imagination to visualize even the expatriation
of an unwilling citizen as an appropriate implied power under certain
circumstances, necessary and proper for carrying into effect other govern-
mental powers, such as the power to wage war or to regulate foreign affairs.
For example, must the Government stand by helplessly as one of its sol-
diers acquires asylum in a foreign country simply because he disagrees with
the philosophy under which this country is waging a particular war? That
person may retain his American citizenship even though he has deserted
the armed forces in time of war and continues to remain beyond the terri-
torial jurisdiction of the United States. Termination of citizenship would
terminate any problem that might arise in this situation, such as subjecting
the United States to embarrassment or potential conflict with another
country, and it would relieve the United States of any responsibility for
protecting that citizen while abroad." Thus one can only hope that in
future expatriation decisions, the Supreme Court will clarify the position
taken in Afroyim and will limit the apparent, all-encompassing effect of
that decision negating all congressional power to expatriate the unwilling
citizen.
"'.387 U.S. 253 (1967).
12 See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). See also notes 46-53 supra, and accompanying
text.
"' See notes 20 and 21 supra, and accompanying text.
124356 U.S. 86 (1958).
12s See note 52 supra, and accompanying text.
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